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NOTEBOOK ENTRIES AS EVIDENCE
OF PRIORITY DATE
Jerome Nathan Field*
W HEN TWO OR MORE PERSONS have independently applied to the
United States Patent Office for a patent on the same inven-
tion, the Patent Office decides which applicant is the first and origi-
nal inventor in a quasi-judicial proceeding called an interference.1
Generally speaking, the applicant establishing the earliest date
of invention by a preponderance of evidence is granted the patent
to the exclusion of all others. 2 The decision of the Patent Office
Board of Interference Examiners may be appealed to the United
States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals,3 which hears and
determines the priority issue on the basis of the evidence produced
before the Patent Office.4 Alternatively, the issues of priority
may be taken to the federal district court by means of a civil suit
against the Commissioner of Patents,5 or it may arise in a patent
infringement suit.6
Priority of invention is a question of fact made to turn upon
proof of conception and reduction to practice. Conception occurs
when a person envisions the invention's theoretical character,
mode of operation and function. 7 This fact of conception cannot
be proved by the inventor's mere allegation in uncorroborated
testimony but must be shown by disclosure of the invention to
* B.S., University of Illinois, 1950; LL. B., Chicago-Kent College of Law, 1954.
Member of the bars of the State of Illinois and the District of Columbia; patent
attorney, Emeryville, California.
1 35 U. S. C., § 135.
2 Phelan v. Green, 71 F. (2d) 298, 21 USPQ 634 (1934) ; Meigs v. McIntosh, 37
F. (2d) 954, 4 USPQ 331 (1930).
3 35 U. S. C., § 141.
4 Ibid., § 144.
5 Ibid., § 146.
6 Holliday v. Pickhardt, 29 F. 853 (1887); Swift v. Jenes, 29 F. 642 (1887);
Leach v. Chandler, 18 F. 262 (1883).
7 Benson v. Vogel, 29 App. D. C. 388, 1907 C. D. 669, 131 0. G. 942 (1907);
Mergenthaler v. Scudder, 11 App. D. C. 264, 81 0. G. 1411 (1897).
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others.' Reduction to practice, on the other hand, takes place when
the invention is reduced to a fixed, practical form.9 For example,
a machine is generally thought of as being reduced to practice
when it is complete and used for the intended purpose10 and a
composition of matter is generally considered reduced to practice
when it is completely composed."
In the matter of establishing these facts, however, the applica-
tion made of the rules of evidence, both by the Patent Office and
by the courts in cases involving proof of priority, has been cri-
ticized by many as being excessively stringent. The rejection of
regularly kept notebooks, offered to show conception and reduc-
tion to practice but lacking in independent corroboration, has been
particularly singled out in this regard. The purpose of this paper
is to call attention to the general confusion surrounding the rule
relating to the use of research notebook entries in suits concerned
with proof of priority and, in so doing, to facilitate a realistic ap-
praisal of this rule.
In its present form, the law holds that notebook entries are
insufficient to prove the date of reduction to practice without in-
dependent corroboration though they may be admitted under some
circumstances to show date of conception. 2 The fact that such
entries may be complete and faithful expressions of the experi-
ments they describe and that no doubt is cast on the veracity of
the entrant has not altered the rule.' 3 Broadly considered, no
significant difference exists between the application of this rule
in Patent Office interference proceedings and in the federal courts.
The rejection of notebook entries is rooted in the law that an
inventor's testimony, without corroboration, is incompetent to
prove date of conception or reduction to practice. 4 The inven-
s Harper v. Zimmerman, 41 F. (2d) 261 (1930).
9 Electric R. R. Signal Co. v. Hall R. R. Signal Co., 6 F. 603 (1881), aff. in 114
U. S. 87, 5 S. Ct. 1069, 29 L. Ed. 96 (1885) ; Elizabeth v. American Nicholson Pave-
ment Co., 97 U. S. 126, 24 L. Ed. 1000 (1878).
1O Roe v. Hanson, 19 App. D. C. 559 (1902).
11 Corona Cord Tire Co. v. Dovan Chemical Corp., 276 U. S. 358, 48 S. Ct. 380, 72
L. Ed. 610 (1928).
12 Collins v. Olson, 102 F. (2d) 828, 41 USPQ 220 (1939).
13 Crane & Start v. Carlson, 125 F. (2d) 709, 52 USPQ 495 (1942).
14 Hisey v. Peters, 6 App. D. C. 68, 1895 C. D. 349, 71 0. G. 893 (1895).
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tor's testimony is considered incompetent because it is self-
serving. 5 Hence, it has been reasoned that written entries of an
inventor, or of one in his employ, are similarly incompetent
without corroboration because of their self-serving nature. 6 To
rule otherwise, it has been said, would do violence to the doctrine
of consistency. The fear of opening the door to fraud constitutes
another reason for the rejection of notebook entries. 17 It is in-
teresting to note, however, that in criminal cases and in civil
suits outside of patent litigation, parties to the proceeding may
testify."' It would, then, appear that courts are inclined to recog-
nize a greater degree of credibility in the testimony of one accused
of a criminal act than in the testimony of one attempting to prove
prior inventorship. A third reason for the rejection of these note-
book entries is that to permit these entries to show reduction to
practice without independent corroboration would give the corpo-
rate research organization an unfair advantage over the individual
inventor who is less likely to maintain systematized records. 9
Recent decisions also state that the federal statute relating
to entries made in the ordinary course of business ° was not in-
tended to encompass notebook entries introduced to prove reduc-
tion to practice.2'
Bearing in mind these enumerated reasons for its existence,
the evolution of this rule has here been traced and analyzed. The
applicable general rule of law relating to entries made in the
ordinary course of business has been similarly analyzed and com-
pared with the rule in patent cases. No attempt has been made to
list exhaustively all cases relating to the employment of notebooks
to prove priority of invention. Rather, only those cases which
best illustrate the origin of the rule, its development, and the
reasons for its continued existence have been selected.
15 Kinsman v. Dickson, M. S. Dec., Vol. 21, p. 323.
16 James v. Richards, 8 Fed. Cas. 243, 3 App. Com'r Pat. 240 (1859).
17 Jardine & Jehle v. Long, 58 F. (2d) 836, 13 USPQ 254 (1932).
18 Lombardi v. Forte, 226 Mass. 529, 116 N. E. 399 (1917) ; Wright v. Frank A.
Andrews Co., 212 Mass. 186, 98 N. E. 798 (1912).
19 Senkus v. Johnson, 166 F. (2d) 597, 77 USPQ 113 (1948).
20 28 U. S. C., § 695.
21 Teter v. Kearby, 169 F. (2d) 808, 79 USPQ 65 (1948).
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The evidentiary rule in patent cases in its present form is con-
cluded to be inconsistent with general evidentiary law. The rea-
sons for this inconsistency are considered inadequate to justify
this exception from the general rules of evidence. It is the
writer's view that there should be no special "patent law" render-
ing notebooks or entries therein insufficient to show reduction to
practice without corroboration. Rather, the applicable rules of
general law should be applied. It is, then, believed that these
notebook records should be received in evidence to show date of
reduction to practice, subject to attack on cross-examination and
to evidence impeaching the recorded dates.
I. RESEARCH NOTEBOOK ENTRIES
As early as 1859, courts considered the testimony of the
inventor or his wife as incompetent in cases made to turn on the
issue of priority, with one court saying
It would be of dangerous consequence to the cause of truth
and justice to permit an inventor, whenever a contest about
the priority and originality of his claim had sprung up, to
go into the market with his own oath, and vend it at the
highest price to ignorant or corrupt purchasers. The tempta-
tions to perjury in such cases, would often be too great for
the infirmity of human nature to resist. The inventor himself
being incompetent, his wife cannot be heard, for her interests
are always identical with her husband's,"
and with another making the observation that the reason for this
rule
is obvious, since the mere conception, while it remains in the
mind of the inventor, must perish with him and can add
nothing to the world's store of knowledge and it is, more-
over, a matter utterly incapable of rebuttal, and were a party
permitted by such a mere allegation of conception to establish
priority of invention a premium to false swearing would be
22 James v. Richards, 8 Fed. Cas. 243, 3 App. Com'r Pat. 240 (1859).
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offered against which honest inventors could have but little
security.2
Moreover, it was realized that the fact of conception of an inven-
tion had to be one which could be evidenced by proof rather than
the mere allegation of the inventor that, at a given time, it was
in his mind. The inventive concept must have taken such definite
form that it could be evidenced by description demonstrating its
completeness. Mechanical skill might still be necessary to give
the conception a workable form but the work of the inventor had
ceased and the work of the mechanic had then begun.24
It was in this way that the use of written descriptions ap-
peared in cases involving proof of priority date, but the decisions
show an early judicial suspicion of the inventor's veracity. This
judicial suspicion was to develop into a full rejection of the inven-
tor's testimony in matters relating to conception and reduction to
practice in the absence of corroboration.
Though it was early established that, as an interested party,
the inventor could not testify as to date of conception and reduc-
tion to practice, the inventor's verbalization at the time of concep-
tion or reduction to practice could be testified to by another as
part of the res gestae.25 In essence, this meant that statements
made by the inventor at the time of conception as disclosures
constituted an exception to the hearsay rule. Since invention
itself is in essence an intellectual process and, like other expres-
sions of thought, will inevitably be made by speech, coupled with
a description of the nature and objects of the invention, such
verbalizations would quite logically constitute a valid exception to
the rule against hearsay. Accordingly, the proof of invention
depended greatly upon corroborating witnesses while testimony
of the inventor himself was not considered competent. The heavy
burden placed on the corroborating witness is manifest through-
28 Kinsman v. Dickson, M. S. Dec. Vol. 21, p. 323.
24 Stevens v. Putnam, 1880 Comm. Dec. 164, 18 0. G. 520 (1880); Farmer v.
Brush, 1880 Comm. Dec. 5, 17 0. G. 150 (1880) ; Berring v. Haworth, 1878 Comm.
Dec. 84, 14 0. G. 117 (1878).
25 Stephens v. Salisbury, 1 MacA. Pat. Cas. 379 (1855).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
out cases to the present day. Typical is the case of Garrat v.
Davidson" wherein the appeal was lost because the witness could
not testify to a knowledge either from his own observation or from
a detailed statement by the inventor concerning the patentable
features of the invention. The sufficiency of corroboration came
to be and has continued to be one of the most strategic evidentiary
problems in cases turning on proof of date of invention.
It would appear, however, that the courts desired to utilize
such corroborating testimony to the greatest extent possible and
were, therefore, obliged to give witnesses the greatest latitude.
In fact, the statement was once made that
Inconsistencies and incongruities in the testimony of witnesses
whose general character for veracity has not been impeached,
should be reconciled, when it can be done without violence,
especially when there is no extrinsic reason for suspecting
error or fraud. And, if the testimony cannot be reconciled,
the presumption of reason, as well as of law, will impute the
variance to an innocent misconception, rather than to a willful
and corrupt misrepresentation, especially when the witnesses
are compelled to make their answers to an ingenious and
artful examination through the medium of an interpreter.2 7
Since that time, however, the courts have become more stringent
in dealing with the testimony of corroborating witnesses.
Thus, in Hisey v. Peters,2 appeal was taken from the decision
of the Commissioner of Patents in a patent interference proceed-
ing concerning a cartridge loading machine. Hisey claimed to
have conceived the invention in April, 1888, though he did not
reduce to practice until September, 1889. The proof of his prior
conception was the assertion of Hisey himself, coupled with the
testimony of a corroborating witness to whom he had shown a
sketch of the invention while aboard a ship bound for Europe some
four and one-half years before the taking of testimony. The
26 3 App. Com'r Pat. 21 (1857).
27 Dietz v. Wade, 3 App. Com'r Pat. 142 (1859).
28 6 App. D. C. 68, 1895 C. D. 349, 71 0. G. 893 (1895).
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witness failed to corroborate Hisey's testimony and the sketch
was never introduced or its absence explained. The court stated,
by way of dicta, that the absence of the original drawing and
tracing, together with the lack of explanation for this absence,
gave rise to an inference adverse to Hisey's claim. Nothing was
indicated as to how the presence of the original drawing would
alter the decision nor, in fact, what weight would be given to these
informal drawings had they been introduced. It would appear,
however, that the value of such writings was recognized in spite
of the fact that they were made by an interested party whose own
testimony was, as a practical matter, worthless in the absence of
corroboration.
The situation was clarified somewhat in Winslow v. Austin,
29
wherein the court stated that the inventor may testify as to the
fact of priority; that is, his testimony is competent and admissible,
but is not to be taken as sufficient to prove conception without
corroborating testimony by others or embodiments of the invention
in some clearly perceptible form, such as drawings or models with
sufficient proof of identity in time. If the rule were otherwise, it
was reasoned, no effective means of rebutting or disproving such
evidence would be possible. As evolved, the rule of that case has
come to mean that the inventor's testimony is admitted but is of
no value in proving the fact of priority without corroboration.
The case of major importance as to the employment of note-
book entries to prove conception in interference proceedings was
the case of French v. Halcomb.3' The interference counts there
were directed to high grade steel compositions. The junior party,
French, depended in part on a long notebook memorandum to
prove conception. French was the only party to read the memo-
randum. Thus, the memorandum could not serve as sufficient cor-
roboration of French's testimony. Further, some doubt was cast
on the actual date of this memorandum by other testimony. It
is significant that the lack of disclosure of this memorandum to
others was the major reason for its lack of sufficiency as proof of
2914 App. D. 0. 137 (1899).
3026 App. D. C. 307, 1905 C. D. 81, 115 0. G. 506 (1905).
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conception. That the memorandum appeared to have been segre-
gated rather than a portion of a systematically maintained note-
book is also of prime importance. The issue of reduction to
practice was not made a controlling issue.
This was not the situation, however, in Robinson v. Thresher."
The question of priority in that case was made to turn upon the
sufficiency of junior party Robinson's evidence tending to show
reduction to practice on and improvement in electric motors in
June, 1902. Robinson was an electrical engineer in the employ of
the assignor, General Electric Company. The evidence tended
to show that as a matter of ordinary procedure, drawings were
carefully and completely rendered and test results fully recorded.
In other words, the personnel of General Electric Company made,
in the ordinary course of research and development activities,
systematic entries of the project contemplated and the work
actually performed at the time of its completion. Logically, it
might be assumed that the rendering of sketches and more com-
plete drawings could establish reduction to practice. The engineer
who made the notebook entries did not testify, however, nor was
his absence explained. His unexplained absence, coupled with other
factors, cast doubt on the success of the tests. Moreover, the ap-
pellant did not attempt to introduce the relevant disclosures which
appear to have been regularly kept for the purpose of showing the
facts stated therein under the shop-book rule. If regularly kept en-
tries were made from personal knowledge by the entrant and if the
entrant's absence could be explained, a strong argument might
have been maintained for the admissibility of these entries to
show not only conception but also reduction to practice. Reduc-
tion to practice might be legitimately claimed since the entries
were made contemporaneously with the completion of the tests
rather than constituting recordation of mere speculative ideas.
In 1908, in the case of Horton v. Zimmer, 2 Horton maintained
that Zimmer's test of the electrical device in question was not
satisfactorily proved because no record appeared to have been
8128 App. D. C. 22 (1906).
32 32 App. D. C. 217 (1908).
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kept of the test. In other words, it was argued that the lack of
notebook records evidenced lack of reduction to practice. The
logical sequence would appear to be that the presence of adequate
notebook records would necessarily establish the presence of reduc-
tion to practice. Adjudicated cases following 1908 did not, how-
ever, follow this line of reasoning, though consideration of note-
book records had, by then, become common practice.
For example, Huff v. GCulick 33 was lost, at least in part, because
the appellant testified from books which were not placed in evi-
dence, apparently because they contained confidential informa-
tion. The court stated that since these books were not placed in
evidence, they could not be corroborative. In Perri v. Thoma,"4
notebook entries were introduced but were found wanting. The
testimony of the senior party was based upon an ambiguous note-
book entry allegedly discovered after the testimony of the junior
party. What weight would have been given this notebook entry
had it been introduced under less suspicious circumstances was not
broached. The employment of memoranda as corroborating the
inventor's priority was also argued in McAfee v. Gray.3 5 The
court ruled that the memorandum which was employed for the
purpose of refreshing the memory of the witness did not have
the effect of corroborating his testimony within the meaning of
the rule that the uncorroborated testimony of a party to an inter-
ference is insufficient to establish priority of invention. No at-
tempt was made to argue the admissibility of the memorandum to
prove the date of reduction to practice.
The status of the law on corroboration of conception was dis-
cussed in detail in the case of Armstrong v. De Forest Radio Tele-
phone & Telegraph Company.6 The unsupported evidence of the
alleged inventor as to the fact of conception and the time thereof
was again said to be insufficient proof. However, it was indicated
that a full and accurate description of the invention, either in ade-
33 38 App. D. C. 334, 1912 C. D. 488, 179 0. G. 579 (1912).
34 39 App. D. C. 460 (1912).
35 47 App. D. C. 237 (1918).
36 280 F. 584 (1922).
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quate word disclosure to others or by drawing or model, would
be considered sufficient for the law requires only that the evidence
of conception be free from ambiguity and such as would enable
one skilled in the art to reduce the conception to practice without
further exercise of inventive skill. It would appear clear then
that regularly kept laboratory notebooks of the type now com-
monly employed by both large and small industrial and academic
research institutions would generally be sufficient to establish the
fact of conception but not reduction to practice.
De Forest, as the inventor in the case of United States v.
De Forest Radio Telephone & Telegraph Company,"7 employed
notebook entries as well as the testimony of his instructed assist-
ant to establish conception and reduction to practice. It appears
unlikely that De Forest could have established reduction to prac-
tice employing his notebook entries alone even though, by that
time, laboratory notebooks were customarily kept in research or-
ganizations. It is apparent, however, that although used com-
monly to corroborate conception, no attempt was made to intro-
duce these notebooks under the shop-book rule as a way of showing
of reduction to practice, i.e., to show that the acts recited were, in
fact, actually performed at the time stated. The absence of an
attempt to so introduce these books is clearly evident in the case
despite the fact that the notebook entries were of such a nature as
to support an argument for reduction to practice. At the same
time, the stringency of interpretation of oral evidence presented
to establish priority was maintained. The court's careful scrutiny
of testimony intended to prove priority was necessitated by the
lack of opportunity to correct fabrication, if present.3 8 The rea-
son why-fabricated testimony by a witness could not be brought
to light by cross-examination, as it is in non-patent cases, was
not disclosed by the court. It is significant, however, that the court
spoke of oral testimony alone as over and against oral testimony
coupled with written memoranda.
3718 F. (2d) 338 (1927).
38 Jardine v. Long, 58 F. (2d) 836 (1932).
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In Collins v. Olson"3 9 the court held that reports clearly de-
scribing the inventor's acts were not proof of reduction to prac-
tice without corroboration though they could serve to show con-
ception. Thus, the inventor's testimony as to reduction to prac-
tice is not satisfactory without corroboration and the notebook
entries which might reasonably be employed as corroboration must
themselves be corroborated. The courts, in other words, have
come to look upon both the testimony of the inventor and his
written disclosures as being identical for this purpose.
Research notebook entries are made to record the actual
work done, whether successfully or unsuccessfully, so that dupli-
cations may be performed and the experiment improved upon if
successful or a repetition may be expressly avoided if unsuc-
cessful. As recordation is not made in contemplation of litigation
but rather serves as an intrinsic part of the systematic attempt to
resolve a problem through research, entries of this nature are
more likely to be truthful than false.4" Yet the cases dramatically
illustrate the extent to which the courts lack knowledge of the
detailed workings of modern research organizations, including the
reasons behind the recordation of experiments. The excessive
fear on the part of the courts of false entries in research notebooks
would, to a great extent, be obviated by apprising judges of the
facts surrounding modern research laboratory activity. False
entries could be shown up, as they are in general evidentiary law,
by cross-examination of witnesses and by the use of impeaching
evidence.
The trend of more recent decisions may be seen in Crane v.
Carlsen.4' In that case, each of the appellants made entries into
his notebook to the effect that the apparatus, an automatic pilot,
worked perfectly on August 28, 1935. Moreover, a document en-
39 102 F. (2d) 828, 41 USPQ 220 (1939). Again, in Kear v. Roder, 115 F. (2d)
810, 47 USPQ 458 (1940), the court emphasized the appellant's notebook entries
and official reports as being "merely" self-serving declarations. That these so-called
self-serving declarations might be good evidence under some circumstances was
not mentioned however, nor was any attention paid to the reasons behind the
existence for these entries.
40 For a discussion of the reasons for keeping research records, see 35 JPOS 239.
41125 F. (2d) 709, 52 USPQ 495 (1942).
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titled "Record of Military Inventors," dated September 16, 1935,
and witnessed, was introduced into evidence. This document indi-
cated that the first flight and operation of the invention was made
on August 28, 1935, and that the results were satisfactory. In
spite of the completeness of documentation, however, these note-
book entries were not considered corroborative of the appellants'
testimony. The fact that the entries were made for the purpose
of recording facts as they occurred, that the documents were
clearly written in the due course of research activity, that no
irregularity of any sort was imputed to them and that the inven-
tors were of impeccable reputation did not alter or modify the
decision. No distinction was drawn between entries made in the
ordinary course of research activity for the purpose of recording
tests made before patent application had been submitted and state-
ments made by applicants after application and for the sole pur-
pose of establishing priority.
In Miessner v. Haschke,42 an interference involving an elec-
trical musical instrument, the court again reiterated the rule that
regular notebook entries may be of considerable moment in deter-
mining the issue of conception but do not of themselves prove the
critical issue of reduction to practice since they are self-serving
statements. In spite of the acceptance of the truthfulness of the
inventor, the rule was said to be so deeply entrenched that courts
were obliged to maintain that "the door should not be thrown
open for the occurrence of the evils the rule was designed to pre-
vent. "
The major reason for the rule, as reiterated in Manny v.
Garlick,43 an interference involving an apparatus for perforating
papers, in Shumaker v. Paulsen,44 an interference involving shield-
ing of airplane spark plugs, and in Lichtenwater v. Caron,45 an
interference involving a chemical method, declares that notebook
42 131 F. (2d) 865, 76 App. D. C. 343 (1942). The court quoted from the opinion
in Patterson v. Clements, 136 F. (2d) 1002, 58 USPQ 539 (1943).
43135 F. (2d) 757, 57 USPQ 377 (1943).
44 136 F. (2d) 686, 58 USPQ 265 (1943).
45 158 F. (2d) 1011, 72 USPQ 271 (1947).
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entries of this type are "self-serving." In Senkus v. Johnson,46
however, another reason was voiced for the first time when the
court said: "Indeed, if we were to relax the said rule now existing
with respect to corroboration merely because of the research
systems in large industrial concerns, it would result, in our opinion,
in having no corroboration rule at all as far as large industrial
business is concerned, but would still require the present rule of
corroboration with respect to others. ,41
Altering the rule of corroboration to allow systematically kept
notebooks to prove reduction to practice would clearly not serve
an advantage to the corporate research organization as against
the individual inventor. Rather, it would serve equally well to
all those who maintain systematic recordation of their experi-
ments. In fact, it might be argued that a greater advantage would
accrue to the independent inventor who, without corroboration
by means of notebook entries, is in a near hopeless position to
show his earliest reduction to practice. It is the independent
inventor, working alone, who has no opportunity to prove actual
reduction. On the other hand, the large industrial research
laboratory, in which the inventor is surrounded by research col-
leagues, may have a satisfactory corroborating witness, particu-
larly so if the work has been performed by a research team. The
stringency of the corroboration requirement as presently inter-
preted by the courts, therefore, still renders proof of actual reduc-
tion to practice most difficult for anyone.
In Teter v. Kearby, 8 it was contended that laboratory note-
books, intended to support the appellant's testimony, were admis-
sible as evidence of the acts recorded therein under the federal
statute relating to records made in the regular course of busi-
ness.49 The court, however, held that the notebook entries were
not encompassed by the statute. Hence it would appear that
46 166 F. (2d) 597, 77 USPQ 113 (1948).
47 166 F. (2d) 597 at 600.
48 169 F. (2d) 808, 79 USPQ 65 (1948).
49 28 U. S. C., § 695, referring to entries made in the "regular course of any
business," specifies that the term "business" includes "profession, occupation, and
calling of every kind."
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only the observations of witnesses could prove the occurrence
recited in the notebook entry. In other words, in a routine ex-
periment, it is necessary to have an observer literally watching
over the shoulder of the inventor during all stages of the reduc-
tion to practice. To much the same effect is the case of Schering
Corporation v. Marzall,5° in which the plaintiff submitted labora-
tory notebooks which were not identified by the person who made
the entries, nor by any person who saw these books contempo-
raneously with the events which they purported to record. The
court held that the entries were not admissible because the statute
was limited to proof of routine clerical entries made contempo-
raneuosly with the event recorded by the person charged with the
duty of maintaining the records.
Finally, in 1952, the case of Allen v. Blaisdell5 summarized
the reasoning behind the need for corroboration. It was there
said:
It is elemental in patent law that in interference cases a
claimant, no matter how honest or truthful he may be, cannot
prevail upon the basis of his own oral testimony standing alone.
The rule which requires corroborating evidence is inviolable
and the tribunals of the Patent Office and the courts may not
depart from it. The corroborating evidence may be presented
in different ways to be sure,-in diaries, notebooks, written
instruments of various kinds, or purely by oral testimony-
but there must be such testimony and it must be convincing.
However harsh the rule may seem at times, the absolute
necessity for it becomes apparent upon reflection. Without
it, the patent system might be virtually destroyed by perjury
or fraud. 2
Yet the very means of corroborating the truthful inventor are
limited by rules at least as harsh. The result is simply that the
inventor is virtually barred from proving his priority date. The
50 101 F. Supp. 571 (1951).
51196 F. (2d) 527, 93 USPQ 428 (1952).
52 196 F. (2d) 527 at 529.
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inventor may not testify; his notebook entries are not corrobora-
tive of reduction to practice; and, as a practical matter, a cor-
roborating witness to the entire experiment which constitutes the
reduction to practice is rare. That the rule is harsh on the indus-
trial research organization is clear. Injured even more seriously
than the large institution, however, is the smaller research organ-
ization and the individual entrepreneur inventor. The ultimate
question is, then, whether the harshness of the rule is justified
and, if not, how it might be modified to provide use of these note-
book entries yet safeguard against the very real danger of false
ones. The evidentiary rules in the general law relating to note-
book entries are most helpful in this regard.
II. ENTRIES MADE IN THE REGULAR COURSE OF BUSINESS
The so-called "shop-book" rule and the evidentiary rule re-
lating to notebook entries made in the regular course of business
are closely related to the rule regarding the use of research note-
book entries hence, for a clear perspective of the rule in patent
cases as to laboratory notebook entries, a general review of the
former and the safeguards they provide against the danger of
false entries would be in order. Entries in business books may
be offered in evidence in ordinary civil litigation in either of
several ways. They may be admitted, if the entries are made by
a party to the suit, against such person, as admissions against
interest13 If the entrant is produced as a witness, the entries
may be used to refresh his memory5" or may come in as records
of past recollections or as declarations against interest.55 None
of these uses, however, requires the employment of an evidentiary
principle peculiar to systematically made records. A rule of this
sort is only involved when the business book itself is offered as
evidence of the truth of its terms.
The American doctrine governing admissibility of books of
account, under which a party litigant who made the entries may
53 Parker v. Priestly, 39 So. (2d) 210 (Fla., 1949).
54 Love v. Swafford, 209 Ind. 514, 199 N. E. 709 (1936).
55 Gus Dattilo Fruit Co. v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 238 Ky. 322, 37 S. W. (2d) 856
(1931).
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give his account books in evidence to support his claims, is gen-
erally considered to be in derogation of the common law principle
that a party shall not be permitted to make evidence for himself.
The rule is historically based upon the ground of necessity. With-
out the rule, the small merchant who kept his books without the
aid of a book-keeper was unable to prove sales made to delinquent
customers because of his disqualification as a witness. In other
words, the common law rule rendering parties and interested per-
sons incompetent to testify in their own behalf necessitated this
exception since the business of tradesmen was usually carried out
without clerks and since many of these transactions, because of
their variety and minuteness, were typically out of the presence
of witnesses. Because only the shopkeeper had knowledge of the
facts of the sale and because he was, in contemplation of law,
incompetent as a witness, he would be remediless unless his books
were received in evidence. Consequently, under conditions which
the courts conceived would make these books trustworthy, they
were admitted to show the facts stated therein. A rule allowing
the reception of books of accounts as evidence was in effect in the
early 1800's in most American courts then in existence. In all
cases, the basis for the rule was "necessity, ' 56 which necessity
as the reason behind the shop book rule had been found present
in the English court decisions of about the same period.
Another justification for the admission of regular entries in
the books of a business was said to rest in their unusual reliabil-
ity. In normal business practice, regularly kept records have a
comparatively high degree of accuracy because such books are
customarily checked as to correctness by systematic balance-strik-
ing. The very regularity and continuity of these records was for
the purpose of effecting that degree of precision and accuracy upon
which the success of a business may, to a significant degree, de-
pend. In like fashion, laboratory notebook entries are also regu-
larly and continually maintained for the purpose of providing an
accurate description of the experiments performed.
56 Butler v. Cornwall Iron Co., 22 Conn. 335 (1853) ; Mitchell v. Belknap, 23 Me.
475 (1844) ; Vosburgh v. Thayer, 12 Johns. L. 461 (N. Y., 1815). See also 12 Bench
and Bar 17.
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In addition to the shop book rule, another generally estab-
lished rule, adopted by statute in some jurisdictions, commonly
referred to as the regular entry rule, provides that regular en-
tries made in the course of business by one no longer available
as a witness would be admissible in evidence after a proper founda-
tion had been laid. While this rule is closely related to the shop
book rule, the two are not identical. The regular entry rule
permits the admission of appropriate entries made in the course
of business only in the event the entrant is no longer available
as a witness whereas the shop book rule sanctions the admission
of regular entries made by a party to the suit, whether available
as a witness or not. For the purpose of this paper, however, these
two rules may be grouped together. The fact that the entrant
is a patent applicant who is no longer available as a witness, or
that the entry was made by a party to the suit who is available,
does not alter the veracity of the entries made in a regularly kept
research notebook.
By the early eighteenth century, the special trustworthiness
of an entry made by a clerk of a party "in the usual way of trad-
ing" was allowed as proof of delivery of the goods after the
entrant had been shown to be unavailable. 7 From this concept
developed the modern common law doctrine that regular entries
made in the routine of a business, upon the personal knowledge
of the recorder or of his employee, and entered at or near the
time of the transaction recorded, as a record of original entry,
are admissible to prove the recited facts, upon a showing that the
entrant is unavailable. The customary accuracy of business
records vital to the survival of the business, coupled with the
training and experience of book-keepers, furnished the special
reliability, and the unavailability of the participants guaranteed
the need for the use of this type of hearsay.
The shop book rule, as applied by the American courts after
the Revolution, took two distinct forms, i.e., the New York form
and the New England form. In essence, the New York form per-
57 Price v. Earl Torrington, 2 Ld. Raym. 873, 92 Eng. Rep. 84 (1703).
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mitted parties to introduce their books in court in all cases if
they were proved by the proper preliminary proof. The New
England form required a suppletory oath by the party. In either
case, the books, if admitted, were allowed to go to the jury as
evidence of the truth of entries which they contained.
58
The New York form was based on Dutch practice as it had
existed for more than a century prior to the Revolution. In the
Dutch colonial courts, according to the explanation provided in
Conklin v. Stawmler,59 the parties appeared before the court and
made their own statements. If the parties differed as to a fact
which the court thought material, either party might be put to
an oath. In this way, objection could be made to this species of
evidence, and the entrant could be interrogated in respect to the
truth or correctness of each item. This practice of admitting
books of accounts, so long observed in the Dutch tribunals, was
the recognized usage when New York adopted its constitution so
it was possible for the court to say, as it did in the case of
Vosburg v. Thayer,6" that the "usage and necessity of admitting
such proof has been so long sanctioned and felt in our courts of
justice that it is now too late to question the admissibility of it."
Nevertheless, the court could, and did, prescribe the elements
necessary to be established for the admission of books of accounts
by saying such were not to be admitted "unless a foundation is
first laid for their admission, by proving that the party had no
clerk, that some of the articles charged have been delivered, that
the books produced are the account books of the party, and that
he kept fair and honest accounts, and this by those who have dealt
and settled with him." No suppletory oath, however, was re-
quired.
Under the New England rule, a party wishing to introduce
books of accounts kept by himself submitted them to the court
for inspection and, if they did not appear to be a register of the
daily business of the party and to have been honestly and fairly
58 Seagrove v. Redman, 4 U. S. (4 Dali.) 953, 1 L. Ed. 779 (Pa., 1797).
59 17 How. Prac. 399 (N. Y., 1859).
60 12 Johns. L. 461 (N. Y., 1815).
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kept, they were rejected. If an erasure or alteration in any mate-
rial part appeared, it was necessary to explain the erasure or
alteration before the books could be admitted. If the books passed
the inspection of the court, the party himself was required to make
oath in open court that they were the books in which the accounts
of his ordinary business transactions were usually kept; that the
entries were made at or about the time of the transactions, were
the original entries, and were correctly made; that the goods
therein charged were actually delivered to the defendant, or that
the services were actually performed in the defendant's behalf;
and that the sums charged and claimed had not been paid."
The disqualification which formerly precluded a party from
testifying as a witness has now been quite generally removed
so that, at the present time, a party can testify in most states
without any more restrictions being imposed on him than are
imposed upon other witnesses. Nothwithstanding this removal of
disqualification, the shop book rule, tracing its origin to a judicial
recognition of a necessity stemming from such disqualification,
has not, except in a few jurisdictions, ceased to operate nor has
any material limitation been placed upon it. Consistency might
seem to dictate the abolition of the rule contemporaneously with
the removal of the reason which produced it; but granting to a
party the right to testify as a witness has, except in rare instances,
had no appreciable influence upon the application of the shop
book rule.
From what has been said, the requirements which must be
met by a business entry before it can be received to prove the
facts stated therein are manifest. To the extent that these re-
quirements apply to safeguard litigants against fraudulent records
in mercantile transactions, they could, with equal force, apply to
laboratory notebook entries presented to prove date of reduction
to practice, once the admission of such entries for this purpose is
sanctioned. That these requirements, where applicable, may be
satisfied by a complete and regularly kept laboratory notebook will
61 Union Bank v. Knapp, 3 Pick. 96 (Mass., 1825).
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be apparent to those familiar with the routine in large as well as
small research organizations.
Generally speaking, in order that the books of a party may
be received in his favor, a proper foundation must be laid by proof
of their character, authenticity, correctness, and regularity,62
unless of course the adverse party admits these matters.13  Stat-
utes governing the admissibility of such books typically prescribe
the foundation which must be laid. One of the earliest enunciated
requirements of a business book entry which must be met before
it may be admitted to prove the facts therein stated is that it
must be an original entry64 or the first permanent record of the
transaction. This restriction is based upon the assumption that
original entries are more accurate than subsequent copies. In
some modes of business, however, it is customary for the daily
transactions to be noted upon slips by the employee which slips
of memoranda are collected and entered into permanent books.
Under these circumstances, the entries in the permanent book
sufficiently comply with the requirement that the entries be origi-
nal.65 In most research organizations, laboratory notebook en-
tries are regularly made in permanent notebooks. These entries
are, ideally, as complete a description of the experiments as is
possible and, in many organizations, are dated, witnessed, and
sometimes notarized. Though the form of these entries may vary
considerably between individuals, the prime purpose is to describe
the work being done or immediately contemplated so that reference
will be available in the future. In this way, repetitions of success-
ful experiments may be made and unsuccessful experiments be
avoided in carrying forward a research program.
Another requirement in some jurisdictions which must be
satisfied before books of account may be received in evidence-is
that the entries must be made on the first-hand observation of
62 Hagen Coal Mines, Inc. v. New State Coal Co., 30 F. (2d) 92 (1928).
63 Wise, Boles & Bowdoin v. Fuller, 66 So. 827 (Ala. App., 1914).
64 Stark v. Burkitt, 103 Tex. 437, 129 S. W. 343 (1910).
65 Plummer v. Struby Co., 23 Colo. 190, 47 P. 294 (1896).
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someone whose job it is to know the fact so recorded.6 This first-
hand observation constitutes the chief foundation for the special
reliability of business records and applies with equal vigor to
laboratory notebook entries. In experimentation carried out by
research organizations as well as by individual inventors, note-
book entries are often made by the inventor himself or by someone
working in close collaboration with him or under his immediate
supervision. In either case, the opportunity for first-hand obser-
vation by the entrant could clearly exist.
Entries, in order to be admissible, must have been made in
the regular course of business and as part of a standardized system
for the keeping of accounts.17 The fact that entries are made by
clerks in the regular routine of their employment is generally con-
sidered the safeguard of their accuracy. The courts dwell to a
great extent on the precision with which numerous employees
record various transactions, together with the absence of any
personal motive to misrepresent the facts of the transactions.
Accordingly, the modern book of account constitutes a high form
of evidence in respect to transactions which are the proper sub-
ject matter for a book of account. There would, by comparison,
certainly appear to be no form of entry upon which as much
reliability could be placed for accuracy and detail as the research
laboratory notebook. The very purpose of these records is to set
forth the exact conditions and results of an experiment. Inten-
tional inaccuracies at the time of entry would be purposeless,
since it is clarity and scientific accuracy which are the primary
purposes for the entry. It would appear, therefore, that the weight
to be given to the accuracy and veracity of a laboratory notebook
entry should be equal to the accuracy and veracity attaching to
entries made in ordinay business transactions, provided both are
made subject to the same safeguards.
Since the reliability of business records depends to a large
extent upon the promptness with which the transactions are re-
corded, it has become a standard requirement, for evidentiary
66 Chaffee v. United States, 85 U. S. (18 Wall.) 516, 21 L. Ed. 908 (1873).
67 Aetna Ins. Co. v. Weide, 76 U. S. (9 Wall.) 677, 19 L. Ed. 810 (1870).
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purposes, that the entry must be made " I at or near the time of the
transaction recorded,"" or "at the time or nearly so of the prin-
cipal fact," '6 or "at or reasonably near the time of the transac-
tion. '17 Any one possessing familiarity with research techniques
knows that it is a general procedure, in research laboratories, to
record the experiment while it is being conducted and to record
the results immediately upon or soon after its completion. It
would seem, then, that the procedures followed in the conduct of
a well-ordered laboratory and the keeping of laboratory note-
books should satisfy the requirements of the evidentiary rule
relating to entries made in the regular course of business.
III. SUMMARY
In its present form, the law in relation to patent matters holds
that notebook entries are insufficient to prove date of reduction
to practice of an invention without independent corroboration.
This rule has been applied to all forms of notebook entries sub-
mitted as evidence of the date of reduction to practice of an in-
vention. The veracity of the entrant and the clarity, completeness
and honesty of the entry has not altered or modified the rule.
Since the testimony of the inventor must be independently cor-
roborated, it has become inordinately difficult for an inventor to
prove his alleged date of reduction to practice. Consequently, the
rule requiring independent corroboration of notebook entries for
this purpose is considered by many as being excessively stringent.
The shop book rule and the regular entry rule of general law
are closely related to the evidentiary rule in patent cases. These
rules permit the admission into evidence of regular entries made
in the course of business; the first of them whether the party
making the entry is available as a witness or not, while the latter
is restricted in application to those cases where the entrant is
unavailable as a witness. Both rules of general law require that
68 Dameron v. Harris, 281 Mo. 247, 219 S. W. 954 (1920).
69Anchor Milling Co. v. Walsh, 108 Mo. 277, 18 S. W. 904 (1892).
7OKamm v. Rees, 177 F. 14 (1910).
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the entries meet certain conditions before they can be properly
admitted to show the facts they recite. These requirements are
designed to mitigate the danger of fraud, but further protection
is provided by permitting these entries to be attacked on cross-
examination or to be impeached by conflicting evidence.
It is suggested that a change in the existing law relating to
patent cases is in order, particularly with respect to the eviden-
tiary value of notebook entries submitted to show reduction to
practice. Such a change in present law might best be effected by
a statute framed to apply the appropriate general evidentiary
rules to notebook entries of this type. Upon satisfying those
requirements which might be set up, notebook entries could then
be employed to show a valid reduction to practice without opening
the door to fraud, particularly so if the privilege to cross-examine
and to impeach be preserved. A statute designed to permit the
admission of regularly kept notebook entries to show reduction to
practice without independent corroboration would obviate to a
great extent the injustice resulting from the present harsh rule.
It would also place the law relating to notebook entries in patent
cases in conformity with established general rules relating to book
entries in non-patent cases.
